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CASE COMMENTS
that the former construction is still in force. Thus the court would
be faced with the same problem that it had here, and to be consistent
would have to validate the issue, since it had been made in conformity
with the court's construction of section 157 of the Constitution.
The court argues that property rights having arisen under former
decisions, they should not be disturbed. But the former court-approved
bonds would not be invalidated by a decision overruling the prior
construction.u And no property rights have arisen under these bonds,
since the rights have not been determined until the issue is approved
or disapproved. The only ones who could validly assert an interference
with property rights are the creditors of the city who were to be paid
with the funds realized from the bonds. But the Supreme Court has
stated many times that the obligation of contracts may be impaired
by judicial decision;, and that "the mere fact that the state court
reversed a former decision to the prejudice of one party does not take
away his property without due process of law".n There being no valid
constitutional objection, therefore, it would seem that the court should
have actually overruled its prior decisions by reversing the judgment
of the lower court approving the bond Issue. As the case now stands,
In spite of the strong language of the court, it overrules nothing.

CONSTRUCTION
1
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provided:

"The fiscal court shall have jurisdiction to appropriate county
funds authorized by law to be appropriated; to erect and keep
In repair necessary public buildings, secure a sufficient jail and a
comfortable and convenient place for holding court at the county
seat; to erect and keep in repair bridges and other structures
[italics ours]. ..
By the doctrine of ejusdem generis the court held this statute did
not give the fiscal court the authority to appropriate money to obtain
2
rights-of-way for a flood wall, the wall to be built by the Department
of War under an Act of Congress requiring assurance that the rightsof-way be furnished without cost to the United States. "And other
structures" does not include "flood walls" for the reason that it is not
" Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U. S. (1 Wall.) 175, 17 1. Ed. 520 (1863);
Douglas v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677, 25 L. Ed. 968 (1879).
2*See Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444, 451 (1923), and long
list of cases there cited. See also Ann. Cas. 1915 578.
'Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444, 450, 68 L. Ed. 382, 44
S. Ct. 197 (1923), and cases there cited.
- Ky. Statutes (Carroll, 1936) sec. 1840.
sJefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 278 Ky. 68,
128 S.W. (2d) 230 (1939).
sPublic Act No. 738 of 74th Congress of the United States, 49
Stat. 1570, 33 U.S.C.A., sec. 701a et seq.
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KENTUcKY LAW JouxAmL
ejusdem generis. Jeffersoni County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County,
278 Ky. 68, 128 S.W. (2d) 230 (1939).
"General words in a statute must receive a general construction, unless there is something in it to restrain them, but in accordance with what is commonly known as the rule of ejusdem generis,
where, in a statute, general words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general word
will ordinarily IWe presumed to be restricted by the particular
designation, and to include only things or persons of the same
kind, class or nature as those specifically enumerated, unless there
is a clear manifestation to the contrary."'
The classic illustration of the application of the rule is the "bull"
case.5 A statute making it a crime to ill-treat any "horse, mare, gelding,
mule, ass, ox, cow, heifer, steer, sheep, or other cattle" would not support a charge for "bull-baiting." It was argued that a bull is superior
to an ox, cow, or heifer and is not, therefore, in a class with them and
could not be included in the term "or other cattle". The rule is based
upon the reasoning that the legislature had in mind a particular class
of persons or objects, and that if it had intended the general words
to operate in their unrestricted meaning, no mention would have been
made of the specific persons or objects'
The strictness with which the earlier English courts applied the
rule' is probably traceable to their jealous attitude toward the encroachment of statutory law upon the common law.8 Modern courts readily
recognize that the legislature is a legitimate source of law, and try to
arrive at the legislative meaning of a statute as enacted. This respect
for statutory law diminishes the value of the doctrine of ejusdem
generis, and accounts for the tendency now to avoid its use whenever
possible?
Certain situations were recognized comparatively early where the
doctrine did not apply. It is only one of several rules of construction,
and is not to be used to override other principles of interpretation.
Its purpose is to determine in a certain class of cases the intent of
the legislature, when from the language of the statute that intent is
not clearly shown. If in any way the intent of its framers can be
'25 R. C. L. 996; quoted in Federal Chemical Co. v. Paddock, 264
Ky. 338, 94 S. W. (2d) 645 (1936). (A statute allowing corporations to
organize without capital stock for "religious, charitable, educational
or any other lawful purpose" only embraces associations ejusdem
generis, and does not authorize the incorporation of a supposedly
mutual organization of farmers that was actually selling products to
non-members for profit.)
5Ex parte John Hill, 3 Car. & P. 225, 33 Rev. Rep. 664, 172 Eng.
Rep. 397 (1827).
OBlack v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 280, 188 S. W. 362 (1916).
Jones, Statute Law Making (1912) 133.
'Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (1921) 45, 46; Black, Construction and Interpretation of the Laws (2d ed. 1911) 368.
9Pound, Courts and Legislation, (1913) 77 Cent. L. J. 219 at 277;
Black, Construction and Interpretation of the Laws (2d ed. 1911) 11.
"oJones, Statute Law Making (1912) 135, 136.
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determined, there is no need for the application of the doctrine.? If
the enumeration of particular words exhausts a certain class or genus,
then there can be nothing left ejusdenv generis, and the general words
must have some meaning other than would be attached to them by
the rule." Where the particular words embrace terms unlike in
meaning or signify greatly different subjects the general word is not
limited by the specific words. Since there is no common genus or
similarity of subjects any classification would be illogical if not
impossible?
Statutes that are generally strictly construed, such as penal statutes1 ' and those giving authority to subordinate governmental
agencies,1 have with conspicuous frequency been interpreted with the
aid of the rule of ejusdern generl,. 6 It would seem that the traditional
policy of the law with respect to this class of statutes alone would
insure a restricted application in particular cases, and that actually
a result already reached is merely expressed in terms of a mechanical
rule. Consequently, the rule of ejusdem generis does not materially
affect the interpretation of this type of statute.
In the instant case it was suggested by the court that the only
authority for building levees is given in Kentucky Statutes, sections
938a-1 to 938a-13. These sections provide for the building of levees
by districts, but require a degree of personal cooperation on the part
of property owners difficult to obtain. As a matter of fact, the fiscal
court has given up the flood wall project, at least for the present.
'While it would seem that the construction placed on the statute has
worked a hardship on an area subject to the possibility of great damage by the recurrence of a flood, it must be remembered that the
authority of local governmental units is only that conferred by stat"2U.S. Cement Co. v. Cooper, 172 Ind. 599, 88 N. E. 69 (1909);
Mills v. City of Barbourville, 273 Ky. 490, 117 S. W. (2d) 187 (1938);
People v. Reilly, 255 App. Div. 109, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 161 (1938); Vassey
v. Spake, 83 S. C. 566, 65 S. E. 825 (1909); State v. Grosvenor, 149
Tenn. 158, 258 S. W. 140 (1924).
"State of Texas v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 63 (1938); U. S.
Cement Co. v. Cooper, 172 Ind. 599, 88 N. E. 69 (1909); Kansas City
S. R. Co. v. Wallace, 38 Okla. 233, 132 Pac. 908 (1913); State v. Savidge,
144 Wash. 302, 258 Pac. 1 (1927); see Vassey v. Spake, 83 S. C. 566,
65 S. E. 825 (1909).
"Goldsmith v. United States, 42 F. (2d) 133 (1930); Phelps v.
Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 318, 272 S. W. 743 (1925); 25 R. C. L. 998 and
cases there cited.
14 Clark & Marshall, Crimes (3d ed. 1927) 46.
McQuillen, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928) sec. 368.
"United States v. One Zumstein Briefmarken Katalog, 24 F. Supp.
516 (1938); Commonwealth v. Kammerer, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 777, 13 S. W.
108 (1890); Black v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 280, 188 S. W. 362
(1916); (penal statutes). Barbour v. City of Louisville, 83 Ky. 95
(1885); Vansant v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 1, 224 S. W. 367 (1920)
(delegations to governmental agencies). Radin, Statutory Interpretation, (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863 at 875. (In a criticism of the doctrine
Prof. Radin says it "would have some value in cases in which the
doctrine of strict construction is applied".)
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ute.Y It is submitted that the court could have relied soley upon the
principle expressed in its opinion of giving "the strictest construction
to such statutes as authorize the fiscal court to expend funds raised
by taxation!'." without using the technical device of ejusdem generis.
R. VINCENT GooDLzTT.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-RIGHT OF THE HUSBAND TO SUE FOR
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
D negligently operated his motor trailer, striking the automobile
in which P's wife was riding and injuring her. The wife in a prior
suit had recovered damages for her own personal injuries. P now
sues for loss of consortium. A husband has such a right to his wife's
services, society and companionship that he may maintain an action
for their Impairment or loss resulting from a third person's negligent
act and such a right is not affected by statutes relating to married
women, nor by the fact that compensation may have been awarded
the wife for her personal injuries. Commercial Carriers,Inc. v. SmailU
The reasoning of the Kentucky court, in line with the weight of
authority, is that there are two separate and distinct injuries: one to
the wife for her personal pain and suffering, and another to the husband for the loss or impairment of his wife's service and society.
These are two independent injuries for which damages may be
recovered in separate actions. 2 Dean Pound points out that as a result
of our method of trial and assessment of damages by jury, if each
were allowed to sue Instead of each recovering an exact reparation,
each would be reasonably sure to recover what would repair the
Injury to both.8 Yet is it more likely to occur here than in other
cases?' The fact is that in many cases because of an injury to one
spouse there is an unmistakable injury to the other. In the principal
case the husband was forced to withdraw from the active social life
he and his wife had enjoyed. They could no longer attend church
together, his conjugal relations were impaired, his former companion
became emotionally unbalanced, a neurotic. This constitutes a real
injury to the husband, one for which he alone is entitled to damages.
Certainly no undesirable result is reached In allowing the husband to
sue in such a case.
The rule Is criticised in a few jurisdictions on the ground that the
action of consortium at common law was based on the husband's
XTJefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 274 Ky. 91,
118 S. W. (2d) 181 (1938).
2Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 278 Ky. 68,
70, 128 S. W. (2d) 230, 231 (1939).
1277 Ky.189, 126 S. W. (2d) 143 (1939).
2
Annotation (1923) 21 A. L. IH.1517.
8Pound, Individual Interest in Domestic Relations, (1915) 4 Mich.
L. Rev. 177, 194.
4Holbrook,
The Change in Meaning of Consortium, (1933) 22 Mich.
L. Rev. 1, 8. It would seem that if this be a valid criticism it is
directed at the entire method of trial by jury under instruction of the
court and should not be directed at this particular action.

